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THE FREEDOM OF GOD
Edward Wierenga

Whenever God is in a situation in which one action is morally best, it follows,
given his essential omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness, that he
knows that the action is best, wants to perform it, and is able to do so. But,
necessarily, God does perform any action he knows to be best, wants to perform, and is able to do so. How could God be free with respect to such an
action? I consider and reject a proposal due to Robert Adams that God might
not want to do what is best. I then consider and deny a proposal due to
Thomas Flint and Richard Swinburne that God's freedom is adequately
secured by his at least occasionally facing situations in which no action is best.
Finally, I defend the claim that God is free with respect to an action even when
a logically sufficient condition of his performing it obtains, since that condition
derives from God's own nature.

Discussions of God and freedom typically focus on the relation of God's
knowledge to human freedom. Of course, if there really is a conflict between
divine foreknowledge and human free action, there might be the same conflict between divine foreknowledge and God's own free action. Thus, when
Evodius confessed that "if I say that God foreknows all of my actions, I can
much more confidently say that he foreknows his own actions and foresees
with absolute certainty what he is going to do," Augustine responded, "Then
aren't you worried that someone might object that God himself will act out of
necessity rather than by his will in everything that he is going to do? After
all, you said that whatever God foreknows happens by necessity, not by
will. "1 In this paper, however, I want to investigate a different problem for
God's own freedom, one that he would not share with other agents whose
future actions he foreknows. Instead, it is a problem that arises precisely
because, on classical theism, God is so different from his creatures. In particular, God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good, whereas
presumably no creature has those attributes, not even accidentally. It would
seem to follow, therefore, that whenever God is in circumstances C in which a
certain action A is the best action, he would know that A is the best action, he
would want to do A, and he would be able to do A. That is, from
(1)

In C, A is the best action for God to do,

it seems to follow, given God's essential possession of these divine attribut-

es, that
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In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is
able to do A.

But it also seems to be true that
(3)

If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and
is able to do A, then God does A in C.

Indeed, (3) would seem to be a necessary truth-how could an omnibenevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient God fail to do what he knew to be best,
wanted to do, and was able to do?2 But then in virtue of God's essential
perfections, whenever he is in circumstances in which a certain action is the
best, a logically sufficient condition obtains for his performing that action.
But now a problem looms: if God is ever in such circumstances, it would
seem that he is unable in those circumstances to refrain from performing
the action in question. He could not refrain from performing the action in
those circumstances, since it is impossible that he be in those circumstances
and not perform it. As Thomas Flint puts it, characterizing this as a libertarian view of freedom, "an agent is truly free with respect to an action
only if the situation in which he is placed is logically and casually compatible with both his performing and his not performing the action."3 In this
paper I will investigate the problem of divine freedom for an essentially
perfect being, on the assumption that libertarianism is the correct view
about freedom. In the following section I will consider a solution that
holds that God need not do what is best. Next, I will consider the response
that God at least sometimes finds himself in circumstances in which there
is no unique best action, so there is at least a range of cases in which he is
free. Finally, I shall offer my own solution that challenges some standard
assumptions about what libertarianism requires.
1. Must God Create the Best?

One way of avoiding this problem of divine freedom is to deny that God
must do what is best. Robert Adams has defended this approach, holding
that" even if there is a best among possible worlds, God could create another instead of it, and still be perfectly good."4 Adams denies, in effect, the
inference from (1) to (2). Now if God were in circumstances in which an
action A is his best action, then it would be hard to reconcile his omniscience with his not knowing that A is best. And I take it that, as a more
detailed presentation of the problem would have put it, if an action is the
best action for an agent it is one of the agent's alternatives, that is, one of the
actions open to the agent. So it would also be difficult to deny that God
would be able to perform the best action, even apart from his omnipotence.
But Adam's view holds that it does not follow from God's perfect goodness that he would want to perform that action. This is suggested by
Adams' remark quoted above, that God could fail to actualize the best possible world "and still be perfectly good." Moreover, Adams' defense of his
position involves considering and rejecting reasons why God's failing to
the best action would be wrong.

THE FREEDOM OF GOD

427

Adams concedes that "by utilitarian standards it is a moral obligation to
bring about the best state of affairs that one can," but he rejects those standards in favor of ones he takes to be "more typical of Judeo-Christian religious ethics." s Accordingly, he casts about for other reasons why God's
failing to actualize the best world would be wrong. He first considers the
possibility that failing to actualize such a world would violate someone's
rights, or involve treating someone unkindly, or harm someone. Adams
has an ingenious response to this suggestion. He argues that if God were
to harm anyone in his choice of a world, it would have to be someone he
created. But by not actualizing the best possible world God would not
harm the creatures existing in it if he failed to create them, since he could
only have obligations to existing creatures. Next Adams claims that God
could actualize a world having these features:
(i)

None of the individual creatures in it would exist in the best of
all possible worlds.

(ii)

None of the creatures in it has a life which is so miserable on the
whole that it would be better for that creature if it had never
existed.

(iii) Every individual creature in the world is at least as happy on
the whole as it would have been in any other possible world in
which it could have existed.6
He then claims that if God does actualize a world having these features he
does not wrong any of the creatures existing in it, "for none of them would
have been benefitted by his creating any other world instead."7 Hence if
God does actualize a world satisfying these conditions, none of the creatures who would then exist would be harmed by God creating that world
rather than a far better one. So if God could actualize a world satisfying
these three traits, it looks as though Adams is correct in holding that God
need not harm anyone or violate any creature's rights if he were to do less
than the best that is open to him. That still leaves it open that there might
be another reason why a perfectly good being might want to do what is
best, but it would not be for wanting to refrain from harming anyone.
Adams' second attempt to find a reason why a perfectly good being
would want to do what is best is somewhat more complicated. Adams
begins by inquiring whether choosing to make a world less good than he
could have made would reveal a defect in God's character." He notes that
an ideal of Judeo-Christian moral theory is grace, which he defines as "a
disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person
loved." 9 Adams then claims that "a God who is gracious with to respect to
creating might well choose to create and love less excellent creatures than
he could have chosen."lo Now if this is merely to identify some virtue God
has that is compatible with doing less than his best, it would not establish
that doing so is compatible with his moral goodness, for he might have
other virtues not thus compatible. And it is not surprising that some virtues
would be compatible with doing less than one's best. Adams in fact identi-
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fies as virtues being noble, being high-minded, and being free from envy,l1
all of which would seem to be compatible with doing less than what was
best. So either Adams' defense is incomplete or else God's exercise of
grace plays some positive role or makes some contribution to the value of
his action (or to a world he actualizes) which enables it to provide a moral
justification of God's doing less than his best.
However, Adams says something that initially suggests that he would
deny that the exercise of grace makes such a contribution. After claiming
that "a God who is gracious with respect to creating might well choose to
create and love less excellent creatures than he could have chosen," he
adds
This is not to suggest that grace in creation consists in a preference for
imperfection as such. God could have chosen to create the best of all
possible creatures, and still have been gracious in choosing them.
God's graciousness in creation does not imply that the creatures he
has chosen to create must be less excellent than the best possible. It
implies, rather, that even if they are the best possible creatures, that is
not the ground for his choosing them. And it implies that there is
nothing in God's nature or character which would require him to act
on the principle of choosing the best possible creatures to be the
object of his creative powers. 12
If God is gracious both in the best of all possible worlds (temporarily
assuming with Adams that there is one) as well as in some lesser worlds, it

is hard to see how his graciousness can make more of a difference in the
value of one world rather than another.
There is a way of thinking of these things, however, that suggests that
divine grace might actually make a difference to the value of a world.
Perhaps in worlds with less perfect creatures God exercises more graciousness, or perhaps his graciousness is more magnificent for going so far beyond
what is deserved. The former idea is suggested by a familiar question
raised in Romans, "Should we continue in sin in order that grace may
abound?" (Rom. 6:1b). Paul's answer, of course, is that eliciting additional
grace is not a good reason to sin; but he does not deny the principles that
added sin results in extra grace and that extra grace is a good thing. A related idea is that of felix culpa, as found in the Exsultet: 0 felix culpa, quae talem
ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! COh happy sin that merited so great a
redeemer").13 A way of understanding this thought is that God's gracious
gift of redemption through the incarnation of his son makes such a contribution to the value of the world that its value exceeds that of a world in
which no one sins. Indeed, in his discussion of the incarnation, Aquinas
cites both of these passages in support of his contention that "there is no
reason why human nature should not have been raised to something
greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater
good therefrom" (S.T. III, 3, ad 3). In other words, the addition of God's graciousness, especially in the form of the incarnation, results in a greater good
(a world of higher value) than a world with no sin and less grace. '4
If human nature is "raised to something greater" by God's gracious pro-
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vision of transformation and sanctification through the incarnation, then
God's graciousness could make a world better and it would give him a reason to prefer some worlds to others. Adams might be right that "nothing
in God's nature or character ... would require him to ... choos[el the best
possible creatures" but that is because it might compel him instead to create a world with creatures who could be made better. In other words, it
might give him a reason to actualize a world containing corruptible creatures who need fixing rather than a world with creatures who are perfect
in the first place!!.
Is divine incarnation so great a good that any world that contains it is
infinitely valuable? Would all worlds with a divine incarnation therefore
be tied for best? These are difficult questions, and to attempt answers
without a fuller account what gives worlds their value, of how to value the
incarnation and the changes it makes, and how to compare values if they
are infinite is rash. 15 Fortunately, we do not need to answer these questions
to see that Adams' attempt to show that a good God might not want to do
what is best is incomplete. Perhaps, as Adams argues, God has some traits
of character, not wanting to cause harm, or, possibly, being gracious, that
are compatible with not wanting to do what is best. But this leaves it open
that a perfectly good God has other traits of character that do make him
want to do what is best. And it may be that the second of the traits Adams
identifies, namely, graciousness, can make enough of a difference to the
value of worlds actually to give God a reason to want to do what is best.

II. A Range of Choices
Adams denies, in effect, that
(2)

In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is

able to do A.
follows from
(1)

In C, A is the best action for God to do,

In contrast, Richard Swinburne and Thomas Flint seem to accept not only
this inference, but the principle,

(3)

If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and
is able to do A, then God does A in C,

as well. They agree, as Swinburne puts it, that "God's perfect
goodness ... constrains him to act in certain ways,"l(· that "God's goodness
thus limits his capacity for choice."'7
Accordingly, Swinburne and Flint attempt to describe cases in which
God is presented with a range of choices, so that he will cOtmt as free at
least in those circumstances in which he is faced with such an array.
Swinburne begins by endorsing the claim that "if there is a best action,
[God] will do it," but he adds that "if there are alternative equal best
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actions, he will do one of them."18 So the first case in which God's goodness leaves him room to make a free choice is the case in which there are
equally good alternatives from which to choose.
The second case is that of an infinite range of choices of a certain sort.
Swinburne introduces this case as follows,
often the range of actions open to God is an infinite range of actions,
each of which is inferior to some other action. Thus, for any world
of conscious agents which God could create ex nihilo, there is plausibly a better one-for instance, one obtained by adding one more conscious agent (sufficiently distant from the others not to crowd them).
And so among the actions of creating conscious agents ex nihilo there
is no best. 19
It is important to note, as Swinburne does, that just as when more than one
alternative is tied for best, God's goodness constrains him to choose from
the set of those tied for best, so, when there is an infinite range of possibilities, each one inferior to some other, if it is better to choose one of those
alternatives rather than none, then God's goodness constrains him to choose
from that range. In Swinburne's example, if it is better to have a world with
conscious agents created ex nihilo than not to, then God's goodness constrains him to pick from the infinite range of worlds like that. But the particular choice of alternative, both in the case of ties for best and in the case of
infinite series with no best, is up to God. As Swinburne puts it, "Insofar as
he acts within that framework, his perfect goodness does not dictate what
he will do; and any acts within that framework we may call acts of will. "20
Thomas Flint's position is structurally similar. He imagines God to face
a "galaxy" of worlds open to him to actualize. Some of these galaxies are
"oligarchic": there is a maximallevel of goodness that the available worlds
can have, and more than one world has it. Other galaxies are "anarchic":
for any world in it, there is a better.21 In the former case, God has a range of
choices tied for best, and in the latter case, God has an infinite range to
choose from. Flint concludes that "neither an anarchic nor an oligarchic
galaxy endangers God's freedom."22
So both Swinburne and Flint think that God is free in at least certain situations, namely, when he faces a tie for best alternative or when there is an
infinite series of increasingly better alternatives with no best. 23 A potential
problem, looms, however. Some philosophers hold that a perfectly good
being (or at least one who is either omnipotent or omniscient) cannot be in
a situation in which there are infinitely many better and better alternatives.
On the face of it, this is a startling claim. Why should whether a being is
perfectly good limit the structure of what situations it can face?24 Philip
Quinn gives the following reason, which is intended to apply to omnipotent
moral agents. He takes it to be "a fairly obvious truth" that
(4)

Necessarily, for all w, w' and x, if w is an actualizable world and
w' is an actualizable world and w is a morally better world than
w', then if x is an omnipotent moral agent and x actualizes w',
then x is such that there is some possible world in which there
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is a y such that y is a better moral agent in that world than he
[that is, xl is in W'.25
Quinn's idea, although (4) does not exactly state this, is that if x were to actualize a world w' when there is a better world wavailable, then it is possible
that someone actualize wand thereby be a morally better agent than x is. But
if it is possible for someone to be morally better than x, then x is not morally
peifect. This assumes that the value of the work redounds precisely to the
moral status of the agent. This assumption seems to me far from obvious,
but perhaps we can see that by considering another version of the objection.
In William Rowe's version, it is God's omniscience which added to
moral perfection prevents him from being in a situation in which he faces
an infinite series of increasingly better alternatives. Rowe claims
(5)

If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better
world it could create, then it would be possible for there to be a
being morally better than it. 2"

In support of this thesis, which he takes to be "plausible, if not self-evident," Rowe adds, "if an omniscient being creates a world when it could
have created a better world, then that being has done something less good
than it could do (create a better world). But any being who knowingly
does something .. .less good than it could do falls short of being the best
possible being."27 Whatever plausibility this principle might have in the
case of choices among a finite number of alternatives seems to me to disappear when the choice in question is from among an infinite number of
choices where it is better to pick one rather than none. But Rowe has more
to say in its defense: he claims that some cases devised by Daniel and
Frances Howard-Snyder, intended to show that beings who choose differently among an infinite set of increasingly better alternatives can be morallyequivalent, actually show the opposite. The Howard-Snyder's first suppose that worlds can be divided into what I shall call permissible and
impermissible worlds. 28 Permissible worlds are those in which no individuals have lives not worth living and no evils are unjustified by a compensating good. Impermissible worlds are those in which some individuals
have lives that are not worth living, or some evils have no compensating
good. They then suppose that the permissible worlds can be ordered
according to value, and they propose three scenarios in which a deity
chooses one of the permissible worlds. In the original case, their deity,
Jove, employs a randomizing device which selects world 777. The
Howard-Snyder's then propose two alternative scenarios. In the first, a
second deity, Juno, uses the same randomizing device and as a result
chooses world 999. They claim that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent.
Next they consider a third deity, Thor, who, eschewing the randomizer,
nevertheless aims at creating a better world than Jove and so chooses
world 888. The Howard-Snyder's contend that Thor is not morally better
than Jove, either. It is at this point that Rowe disagrees. He claims that
Jove and Thor might have different standards in virtue of which Thor
would count as morally superior. He writes, "Jove's standard of goodness
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in world creating is such that he is prepared to settle for any good [permissible] world even if there is a better one he can create. Thor, however, has
a higher standard. He is not prepared to create any of the good worlds
from WI to W800 provided there is a better one he can create." Rowe concludes that his assessment of Thor undermines the attempt of the HowardSnyder'S to discredit (5).
A modest revision of these stories shows, I think, that there is no difference between these deities, after all. As they develop their account, the
Howard-Snyder's assume that there is a minimal permissible world.
(Their numbering begins with 1.) But why should we think that an infinite
array of permissible worlds such that for every world there is a better must
have a least valuable member? Perhaps those features that make a world
permissible have no lower bound. Swinburne identifies among the things
that contribute to the value of a world, in addition to the presence of conscious agents, "the kinds of knowledge and powers [God] gives to things
and ... the lengths of days he keeps them in being." We might add to this
list the amount of pleasure these agents experience or the kind of compensation there is for the evils they endure. It is plausible to suppose that having conscious agents with knowledge and power, who live acceptably long
lives, relatively free of pain and compensated in appropriate ways for the
evils they endure contributes to the value of a world. And, of course, there
will be no limit to how many such agents there could be, no limit to how
long they could live, and no limit to how sufficiently they can be compensated for the evil they endure. That is why it seemed plausible to suppose
that there could be an infinite series of ever more valuable permissible
worlds. But it seems equally plausible that there might be no lowest
acceptable level of knowledge and power, no shortest acceptable lifespan,
no minimal acceptable amount of pleasure or compensation for evil for a
world to be permissible. In other words, just as there might be no best of
all possible worlds, there might also be no least acceptable world. So when
God chooses a world, or when the deities in the Howard-Snyder's example
choose a world, it might not only be the case that for any world chosen
there is a better; it might also be the case that for any world chosen there is
an acceptable world that is not as good. In that case, it is hard to see how
Thor in the example could be acting on a nobler principle or higher standard than Jove. Each picks a world to which infinitely many worlds are
superior and which is itself superior to infinitely many other worlds. Thor
does not have a principle according to which he rejects as unsuitable more
worlds than Jove rejects. There can be no basis for Thor's rejection of
worlds lower than 800, if there are infinitely many in that category; both
make an arbitrary choice. These deities can create worlds of differing
value without thereby differing themselves in goodness.
I have been arguing in support of the proposal of Swinburne and Flint
that God might be presented with an infinite series of worlds from which
to choose with no feature of any of those worlds compelling him, in virtue
of his perfect goodness, to create it. They had suggested that, as well as the
possibility that God might be presented with ties for best action, as part of
an attempt to provide room for God to act freely, unconstrained by his perfect nature. Bu! it is time to return to the question of whether this proposal
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is an adequate defense of God's freedom. I think that it is not, for it
amounts to saying that God is free only when it does not matter what he does.
In any situation in which there is a best action open to God, Swinburne and
Flint agree that his nature compels him to do it. They only find room for
God's freedom in circumstances in which any choice he makes is on a par
with any other, where he might as well choose blindly or randomly, and
that is not a significant amount of freedom.

III. God's Freedom
We began by noticing that it seems to follow from
(1)

In C, A is the best action for God to do,

that
(2)

In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is
able to do A.

Moreover,
(3)

If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and
is able to do A, then God does A in C

appears to be necessarily true. Then we asked how God could ever be free,
if, whenever an action was his best alternative, a necessary condition of his
performing it, namely, (2) it obtains. Adams attempted, unsuccessfully I
claimed, to deny the inference of (2) from (1). Swinburne and Flint accept
the conclusion that God is not free whenever he has a best alternative, and
they try to delineate what I claimed to be an unacceptably limited role for
his freedom, namely, when what he chooses does not matter. We should, I
think, look more closely at the assumption that if a necessary condition for
God's performing an action obtains, then he does not perform that action
freely. Thomas Flint claims, as we saw, that "an agent is truly free with
respect to an action only if the situation in which he is placed is logically
and casually compatible with both his performing and his not performing
the action."3l No doubt libertarians will agree that an agent is free with
respect to performing an action only if there are no antecedent causally sufficient conditions for the agent's performing the action. But why should
we, even if we are libertarians, extend this to antecedent logically sufficient
conditions? After all, at least some libertarians are prepared to countenance the prior truth that an agent will (freely) perform an action, despite
its being a logically sufficient condition of the agent's performing the
action. So why should we think that the truth of
(2)

In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is
able to doA

is incompatible with God's doing A freely in C?
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Here I think an appeal to compatibilist accounts of free will, of all
things, is instructive. Compatibilists hold that an action can be free even
though antecedent causal conditions for its performance exist. But canny
compatibilists32 insist that not just any antecedent causal conditions are so
compatible-they have to be the right ones, arising in the right matter.
Often the right ones are taken to be the agent's beliefs and desires. And the
right manner is the customary way in which people come to have beliefs
and desires, not through drugs or hypnosis or nefarious neurosurgeons
manipulating their brains. The compatibilist then defends the claim that
an action caused by an agent's beliefs and desires arising in the right way
is nevertheless free by emphasizing that the beliefs and desires are the
agent's own, that they are internal to the agent.
Those who reject the compatibilist account are often persuaded by arguments, like those of Peter van Inwagen,33 that purport to show that, if determinism is true, an agent's beliefs and desires themselves have antecedent
causes stretching back to before the agent even existed. The relevant
causal conditions are thus not really internal to the agent. 34 The insight, to
repeat, of the compatibilist is that the right antecedent conditions, internal
to the agent, are compatible with the agent acting freely; on this interpretation, the compatibilist's mistake is in taking the proffered conditions to be
internal in this way.
Let us apply the compatibilist's insight to the case of God. Even if in
some circumstances C God's knowing that A is the best action, his wanting
to do A, and his being able to do A is a logically sufficient condition of his
doing A in C, it is nevertheless in virtue of his own nature that he knows that
A is the best action, wants to do A, and is able to do A.35 There is no long
chain stretching back to things separate from him that give him this constellation of knowledge, desire, and ability; it is due to his own knowledge
and power and goodness. I see no reason not to say, accordingly, that God
is free, even when he does what is best.36
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human nature) can contribute to the value of a world is to assume, what seems
plausible, that it is not merely creaturely happiness, as in Adams' account, that
contributes to the value of a world. Quinn (op. cit.) criticizes Adams for his
exclusive interest in "felicity".
15. An interesting discussion of the problem of infinite utility is Jamie
Dreier, "Boundless Good" (unpublished).
16. Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), p. 134.
17. Ibid., p. 135.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Thomas Flint, "The Problem of Divine Freedom," p. 258. I am suppressing the details of Flint's meticulous and ingenious account of how worlds are
collected into galaxies as well as his arguments about other types of galaxies.
22. Ibid. p. 259.
23. I have not presented Flint's accow1t fully enough to show that this is
indeed his view. Given what we have seen in the text, we are only entitled to
attribute to him the claim that it is possible that God is free.
24. Perhaps a perfectly good being will never face a situation in which an
alternative is to make reparations for a past moral wrong, but this is different
from what I am calling the structure of a set of alternatives.
25. Philip L. Quinn, "God, Moral Perfection, and Possible Worlds," p. 213.
26. William L. Rowe, "Can God Be Free?" THIS JOURNAL, THIS ISSUE. See also
his "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom," in Eleonore Stump, ed.
Reasoned Faith (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 223-233.
27. "Can God Be Free?".

436

Faith and Philosophy

28. Daniel and Frances Howard Snyder, "How an Unsurpassable Being
Can Create a Surpassable World," Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994): 260-268.
Rowe replied in "The Problem of No Best World," Faith and Philosophy 11
(1994): 269-271, as well as in "Can God Be Free?".
29. "Can God Be Free?".
30. The Christian God, p. 135.
31. "The Problem of Divine Freedom," p. 255.
32. I believe this term is due to Daniel Dennett, but I have not been able to
find the source.
33. Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983).
34. I do not pretend to be summarizing van Inwagen's arguments here,
which are considerably more involved and ingenious than we need to see now.
35. Thomas Talbott defends a similar view in "On the Divine Nature and
the Nature of Divine Freedom," Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 3-24. Talbott
quotes the following instructive passage from C. S. Lewis:
Whatever human freedom means, Divine freedom cannot mean indeterminacy between alternatives and choice of one of them. Perfect goodness
can never debate about the end to be obtained, and perfect wisdom cannot debate about the means most suited to achieve it. The freedom of
God consists in the fact that no cause other than Himself produces His
acts and no external obstacle impedes them-that His own goodness is the
root from which they all grow and His own omnipotence the air in which
they all flower./I The Problem afPain (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 35.
36. I am grateful to Richard Feldman and John Bennett for helpful discussion of the issues of this paper and to William Rowe for allowing me to see an
advance copy of "Can God Be Free?".

